

Do Protests Matter?

Evidence from the 1960s Black Insurgency

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Abstract

How do the subordinate few persuade the dominant many? Elite theories of political influence posit marginal groups exert little power. Pluralistic accounts suggest non-elites can set agendas, sway public opinion and shape policy. This article evaluates both theories in the context of black-led protests in the 1960s. Contrary to the elite model, I find evidence of a punctuated pluralism in which subordinate groups, through protests, can temporarily break elite dominance of political communication and “lead from below” to influence national discourse and generate conditional feelings of support or opposition in the majority, depending on the type of tactics employed. In presidential elections, proximity to black-led nonviolent protests increased white Democratic vote-share whereas proximity to black-led violent protests caused substantively important declines and likely tipped the 1968 election from Hubert Humphrey to Richard Nixon. This research has important implications for existing theories of political communication, social movements and voting behavior.

Key words: protests, political communication, political violence, voting behavior

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How do the subordinate few persuade the dominant many? Democratic theory argues marginalized minorities within majoritarian polities should pursue winning coalitions. Elite theorists of influence, however, find that average citizens and mass interest groups exert minimal power (Mills 1956; Schattschneider 1960; Zaller 1992; Carmines and Stimson 1990). Looking at effects on United States government policy, Gilens and Page (2014) find “mass-based interest groups and average citizens have little or no independent influence” (565). More pluralistic accounts of democratic politics find mass-based factions or interest groups can effectively represent their constituencies (Truman 1951; Dahl 1961; Lee 2002; Bishin 2009; Gillion 2012). Lee (2002), for example, challenges the model of a “one-way, top-down flow of political communication from elites on center stage to spectators in the audience” and finds that, at times, “oppositional counterpublics” of non-elite actors can shape mass opinion (18-19).

The United States in the 1960s and early 1970s offers a useful context in which to test competing elite and pluralistic models of public opinion and policymaking. In that period, racial attitudes shifted dramatically on a range of issues. At the same time, grassroots activists mobilized at a scale rarely before seen and elite political actors pushed for both landmark civil rights legislation as well as new forms of social control (Carmines and Stimson 1990). This paper attempts to test whether subordinate group protest activity played an influential role in shaping dominant elite discourse, public opinion and voting behavior. Research on the political consequences of protests is mixed with some studies suggesting accommodation to insurgent demands, others finding increased opposition or little to no effect. Summarizing scholarship on protests in the United States in the 1960s, Giugni (1998, 378) notes, “in the whole it is difficult out of this impressive amount of empirical work to provide a clear-cut answer to the question whether disruption can produce policy changes....”

This study improves on existing literature in a number of ways. First, to reconcile competing elite and pluralistic models, I build on Lee (2002) and Kinder and Kam (2010) to offer a theory of “leading from below” that recognizes elite dominance of political communication but allows for a punctuated

pluralism in which subordinate groups, through disruption and choice of tactics, can influence media coverage and framing to shape elite discourse, public opinion and voting behavior. Second, most Americanist work on the political consequences of protests focuses exclusively on nonviolent or violent protest movements or, in some cases, collapses heterogeneity in the means of disruption (e.g., Cloward and Piven 1971; Lee 2002; Gillion 2012). Building on scholarship by comparativists and sociologists, the theory argues that nonviolent and violent tactics will, on average, generate categorically different reactions in the dominant group (Snyder and Kelly 1976; Rojas 2006; Olzak and Ryo 2007; Stephan and Chenoweth 2008). Third, prior work has also tended to aggregate data by year and country or region (e.g., Welch 1975; Carmines and Stimson 1990; Lee 2002; Weaver 2007) obscuring important temporal and geographic variation. I use a more fine-grained time series and geocode a national sample of protests and counties to estimate potential effects for every county-protest dyad, irrespective of political boundaries. Finally, almost all prior work is challenged by issues of endogeneity. I use a variety of methods including Granger causality tests, a panel design, matching and rainfall as an instrument for protest activity to identify causal effects of black-led protests.

Examining data on protest activity, Congressional speech, public opinion and county-level voting patterns, I find results consistent with the hypothesis that protests during the 1960s black insurgency are independently influencing elite discourse as well as white attitudes and behavior and that the tactics employed produce distinct reactions. In public opinion polls between 1950 and 1980, a majority of subjects identified “civil rights” as the most important problem facing America at the same time that nonviolent black protest activity peaked and, likewise, responded with “social control” when black-led violent protests were most active.¹ I also find that black-led nonviolent protests precipitate increased Congressional debate about “civil rights” and increase proximate county-level white Democratic vote-share in the 1964, 1968 and 1972 presidential elections. By contrast, disruptions in the same period in

¹For plots on black-led nonviolent and violent protest activity, see Figure 11 in Appendix Section 1.

which some protester-initiated violence occurred spark Congressional discussion of “crime” and “riots” and cause a statistically significant decline in proximate county-level white Democratic vote-share.

Simulating counterfactual scenarios in the 1968 election, I estimate that fewer violent protests are associated with a substantially increased likelihood that the Democratic presidential nominee, Hubert Humphrey, would have beaten the Republican nominee, Richard Nixon. Also, Nixon’s “Southern Strategy,” far from winning the South, was effective by appealing to more racially moderate whites in the Midwest and Mid-Atlantic. Finally, while the mid-1960s multiracial Democratic coalition was fragile, moderate white flight from the Democratic party might not have been inevitable and that, but for the joint effect of violent protests and widespread, easily triggered white ethnocentrism, campaigns built on “law and order” and other forms of anti-black affect might never have carried the day as a strategy to build new, winning, national right-of-center coalitions (Mayer 2002; Mendelberg 2001). Nonviolent black-led protests played a critical role in tilting the national political agenda towards civil rights and black-led resistance that included violence contributed to outcomes directly in opposition to the policy preferences of the protesters.

Elites, insurgents, public opinion and political behavior

Figure 1 presents data on what Americans, when surveyed, indicated was the “most important problem” facing the country between 1950 and 1980.² Looking at issues of race, two trends are noteworthy. First, from 1950 into the early 1960s, the percentage of Americans responding that civil rights was the most important problem remained low. In the early 1960s, however, it spiked from approximately 5 percent in December of 1962 to 48 percent in mid-1963 and then faded almost as quickly. Second, up until the mid-to-late 1960s, concern about “social control” as the most important problem remained in the

²As America was about 88.6 percent white in 1960, I assume these data to be representative of white public opinion.

Public Opinion on 'Most Important Problem,' 1950–1980




Figure 1: Scatter plot of public opinion on the ‘Most Important Problem,’ 1950 to 1980. Each letter represents the percentage of people answering that a particular issue is the most important problem in America in a single poll (e.g., ‘f’ = foreign policy; ‘e’ = economy; ‘s’ = “social control”; ‘c’ = civil rights). Lines represent a smoothed trend across polls (with Loess). Data sources: Niemi, Mueller, and Smith (1989); Loo and Grimes (2004).

single digits and then gripped the country to reach an initial peak of about 41 percent of respondents in August of 1967, before declining rapidly after 1971.

The rapidly shifting attitudes observed in polls were also evident in swings in white voting behavior, too. In 1964, Republican presidential candidate Barry Goldwater promised “law and order” against “crime in the streets” but lost in a blowout to President Johnson, a champion of civil rights (Flamm 2005). By 1968, though, the tide had turned and Republican presidential candidate Richard Nixon successfully marshaled a tough-on-crime campaign to help win the Whitehouse. Though “law and order” rhetoric had been popular in the South for decades (Finkelman 1993), it was not until the mid-1960s that the slogan took root outside of the old Confederacy. Ronald Reagan, for example, echoing Goldwater, ran on “law and order” and won the 1966 gubernatorial race in California (Flamm 2005).

In short, the 1960s saw rapid temporal and geographic variation in white concern for race-related policy, first with civil rights and, later, with law and order.

Elite and pluralistic theories of influence

Whether this variation in elite discourse, public opinion and voting behavior is better explained by theories emphasizing the role of elite actors or mass movements is unresolved. The consensus view in political science is that elites shape mass opinion (Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Zaller 1992; Lee 2002). Modern societies are sufficiently complex that everyone, to some degree, depends on others to stay informed (Lippmann [1922] 1946; Zaller 1992). Through media, political elites influence what issues are top of mind, how issues are framed and which stories are most prominently covered (Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Baumgartner and Jones 2010). Carmines and Stimson (1990), Zaller (1992) and Weaver (2007) emphasize the role of elites like Goldwater and Johnson in driving the public taste for civil rights and “law and order.”

Lee (2002) and Gillion (2012) question the elite model’s restrictive exclusion of possible lateral and non-elite influences on policy makers and public opinion. Lee finds evidence of bottom-up changes in racial attitudes among whites. Gillion (2012) finds evidence in favor of protests serving as an informative cue to Congress. Lee builds on Key (1949) to posit a theory of political communication in which elites remain influential but that also allows for “activated mass opinion” in which the context of specific groups, history, and issues provide additional sources of information and interpretation. Within this framework, there are multiple mass publics and non-elite counterpublics (Dawson 1994) that, in times of social and political contestation, can also serve as well-springs of influence on mass opinion. Using data compiled from both surveys and constituent mail between 1948 and 1965, Lee finds that black-led movement actions repeatedly precipitated changes in white public opinion.

Cloward and Piven (1971) propose an “insurgency thesis” in which mass unrest induces concessions from elite actors attempting to buy off a movement. Empirical tests of the hypothesis have been

contradictory. In the wake of the 1960s and 1970s protest movements, scholars found that political elites responded to the civil unrest through increased investments in social policy and other redistributive policies (Cloward and Piven 1971; Hicks and Swank 1983; Fording 1997; 2001). Fording (1997) finds that, under specific conditions, political violence by African Americans led to greater spending on Aid to Families with Dependent Children. Similarly, Skrentny (1996) finds that the sense of crisis following violent unrest helped shift white elites in business and politics to support programs like affirmative action.

A number of studies find protests and civil disorders were associated with enhanced expenditures on policing and efforts at coercive control (Feagin and Hahn 1973; Welch 1975; Sears and McConahay 1973; Button 1978; Fording 2001) but recent work also finds there is little independent effect of protests on repression outside of strategic use by elites (Weaver 2007). Rojas (2006) finds the effectiveness of black-led protests on college campuses depends on whether disruptive or non-disruptive tactics are employed. Soule et al. (1999) finds women's collective action exerts little influence on congressional hearings and roll call votes.

Nonviolent and violent protest in comparative perspective

Looking at nonviolent and violent movements between non-state and state actors between 1900 and 2006, Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) find that nonviolent campaigns are successful about 53 percent of the time as compared with 26 percent for violent efforts. Stephan and Chenoweth explain that nonviolent methods are more effective, on average, as compared with violent tactics because they enhance both domestic and international legitimacy while also constraining state deployment of violence to suppress the movement. Wilkinson (2004) investigates why local politicians in India often incite violent inter-ethnic protests while state-level politicians sometimes work to thwart the same events and finds electoral incentives encourage state-level actors to maintain the peace when such actions are useful to sustaining winning multi-ethnic political coalitions.

Protests in black political thought

Like insurgent movements in many stratified societies, the question of how African Americans should pursue justice split broadly in to two competing schools of thought, one more moderate and the other militant (Walton 1971). In the early part of the decade, civil rights leaders like Thurgood Marshall and Ella Baker worked within the American political system and endorsed nonviolent strategies like lawsuits and grassroots direct action to force incremental progress over time (Ransby 2003). The logic of such tactics was, in part, that occupying the moral high ground, or engaging in “respectability politics,” helped draw attention to and sympathy for the civil rights movement among persuadable members of the more moderate white majority (Higginbotham 1994). Bayard Rustin, a critical influence on Martin Luther King Jr.’s use of nonviolence and a key organizer of the 1963 March on Washington, argued “[T]he country’s twenty million black people can[not] win political power alone. We need allies. The future of the Negro struggle depends on whether the contradictions of this society can be resolved by a coalition of progressive forces which becomes the effective political majority in the United States” (1965).

The strategy of nonviolent civil disobedience required routinely subjecting protesters to extreme violence at the hands of white supremacists while at the same time defining black progress in terms that were acceptable to white moderates. Beginning in the mid-1960s, the influence of traditional civil rights leaders was challenged by black nationalists like the Stokely Carmichael and Angela Davis (Carmichael and Hamilton 2008; Olsson et al. 2014). In simple terms, the earlier era of the civil rights movement pursued a median white voter strategy grounded in racial interdependence (Frymer 1999). Black nationalists, by contrast, espoused a strategy grounded in a commitment to racial independence that sought advances through the development of black-led institutions and rejected the contingent power of coalition politics in which black progress depended heavily on appeals to white conscience. Protest tactics that included violence in self-defense were generally seen by black nationalists as a legitimate and essential tool in the repertoire of resistance against institutionalized racism (Carmichael and

Hamilton 2008). Though the two movements shared many goals, in the context of the 1960s the two approaches came to represent competing theories of how a subordinate group might amass power and fight for equality in a discriminatory, only partially-democratic society.

Theory: Leading from below

To reconcile elite models of political communication with arguments for pluralistic influence I offer a theory of “leading from below.” The theory assumes that social groups are ranked in hierarchies (Sidanius and Pratto 2001) and that the norms, biases and structural inequality enforced by the dominant group substantially constrain the ability of subordinate groups to assert their interests. For example, reporting in the majority-oriented media is likely to exhibit systematic bias against an insurgent movement (Davenport 2009). Members of dominant groups are also likely predisposed to ethnocentric views that, if activated, significantly undermine the potential for subordinate group interests to advance (Key 1949; Sniderman and Piazza 1993; Kinder and Kam 2010). Thus, the fundamental challenge for every subordinate minority group in a democratic polity is to maximize their own group’s interests in the face of stark asymmetries while also minimizing the degree to which ethnocentrism gets mobilized in the dominant majority.

Kinder and Kam (2010) find that feelings of ethnocentrism result from a combination of inherited and environmental factors. Two key contextual factors for whether ethnocentrism will be salient on a particular issue hinge, “on the ability of the issue to command the public’s limited and fickle attention and on how the particular issue is framed” (38). The theory of leading from below builds on this idea of conditional ethnocentrism and asserts that, despite elite dominance of public opinion, subordinate groups are able to engage in agenda setting and framing through disruption strategies and choice of tactics. Subordinate group protests operate like a crisis or “triggering event” that draws attention from mass media and political elites (Baumgartner and Jones 2010; Dearing and Rogers 1996; Skrentny 1996; Kinder and Kam 2010). Through disruption, subordinate groups overcome collective action problems

and upend the normal equilibrium to achieve a form of punctuated pluralism in which their concerns temporarily come to the fore of public opinion and policy making (Lee 2002). By influencing media coverage and elite discourse, subordinate groups are able to influence regional and national agendas (McCombs and Shaw 1972; Lee 2002; Andrews and Edwards 2004; Gillion 2012).

The theory further predicts that protest tactics play a critical role in how the media frame subordinate group demands. Kinder and Kam (2010) argue that activation of ethnocentrism is more probable, “when politics is portrayed as conflict among groups” (40-41). Nonviolent protests, particularly events that are relatively large or met with force by the dominant group, are more likely, on average, to generate coverage of subordinate group demands that do not frame the issue as a battle between groups. For example, the average newspaper might focus on demands for basic civil rights. These more sympathetic frames are predicted to either not activate or even reduce levels of ethnocentrism in the median member of the dominant group (Lee 2002; Transue 2007; Kinder and Kam 2010). Violent protests by a subordinate group, by contrast, are predicted to generate coverage that is more likely to frame the disruption as a struggle between groups. For example, the average media outlet might frame the protest primarily as an act of collective crime by the subordinate group. This unsympathetic media coverage is predicted to increase feelings of ethnocentrism in the median dominant group member (Sears and McConahay 1973; Giles and Hertz 1994; Gilliam and Iyengar 2000; Marcus et al. 2005).

In terms of electoral politics, these conditional feelings of support will have multiple implications. First, decreased ethnocentrism has the potential to reduce racial and ethnic bloc voting such that the interests of a statistical minority can be incorporated into the agenda of a winning majority (Bishin et al. 2016). Second, following prior work in social psychology, feelings of intergroup sympathy and decreased ethnocentrism will tend to trigger less egoistic, more altruistic and less hierarchical attitudes (Batson et al. 1997). These changes, in turn, allow for more egalitarian policy to be enacted. Increased ethnocentrism in the dominant group, likely increases antipathy to outgroups and motivates greater

concern for maintaining the existing social hierarchy, such as with calls for more repressive state policy (Kinder and Kam 2010; Sidanius and Pratto 2001).³

The theory further builds on the idea that political development in the United States can be seen as an ongoing power struggle between two competing racial orders, one coalition fighting to maintain white supremacy and another, “transformative egalitarian” coalition, pushing to dismantle racial hierarchy (King and Smith 2005). More generally, the white supremacist coalition can be described as ethnocentric or fighting for a system of government organized in significant part to support the material and political interests of a dominant ethnic or racial group in the context of a diverse society (Yiftachel 1997). Leading from below theory predicts that nonviolent tactics by a subordinate group, on average, will reduce ethnocentrism and move persuadable members of the majority in to the egalitarian coalition. Conversely, the theory predicts that violent protests by a subordinate group will increase ethnocentrism in the majority and grow the ethnocentric coalition (Wilkinson 2004). Table 1 presents an overview of the theory and predictions.

³Evidence suggestive of a concern for safety among whites can be found in data on gun sales. According to one estimate, “gun sales to whites more than doubled during the weekend after Watts” (Flamm 2005, 59).

Subordinate group tactic →	Agenda setting effects →	Framing effects →	Ethnocentrism effects →	Outcomes for dominant group
Nonviolent protest	Disruption generates press, particularly when events are large or state and/or vigilantes engage in repression	Media coverage is less likely to be framed in terms of group conflict	Likely reduces or has no effect on ethnocentrism in median member of dominant group	Move dominant group elites and masses towards egalitarian coalition (e.g., greater concern for subordinate group rights)
Violent protest	Disruption generates press, particularly when events involve significant injury, property damage or death	Media coverage is more likely to be framed in terms of group conflict	Likely activates increased ethnocentrism in median member of dominant group	Move dominant group elites and masses towards ethnocratic coalition (e.g., greater concern for repression and maintaining social hierarchy)

Table 1: Overview of the leading from below theory and predictions for how subordinate disruption strategies influence agendas, framing and ethnocentrism to shape dominant group response.

Data and variables of interest

To empirically test the theory of leading from below, I use data on protests, public opinion, Congressional speech, and voting behavior. I also use a variety of data sets from government sources to provide county-level demographic information and historic rainfall.

Protests

The data on protests comes from two distinct sources. Though both are built primarily from newspaper accounts of protest, they differ in several important ways. Olzak and West (1995) covers protest activity between 1954 and 1992 for a wide range of groups and causes and includes data on both nonviolent and violent protests. Carter (1986) provides data exclusively on black-led protests between 1964 and

1972 that escalate to violence outside of institutional settings such as colleges or prisons.⁴ The Carter data defines a violent protest as an event that involves at least 30 participants and generates a detectable level of injury or property damage. For the analysis of nonviolent events, Olzak and West data is used exclusively. For the analysis of violent protests, both Olzak and West and Carter data are used, where possible, to both cover gaps in times series and replicate results across different data sets. For the analyses of violent protests in April, 1968, only the Carter data is used as the Olzak and West data records few nonviolent or violent protests in the wake of Martin Luther King Jr.'s assassination.

The primary explanatory variable, $Protest_{i,t}$, indicates whether county i was “treated” with black-led protest activity in year t . Both data sets provide the date, city and state of each protest as well as several measures of the event’s intensity such as the number of participants, arrests, injuries and deaths. All protests were geocoded using city-level information and the distance between protests and counties measured as the shortest distance between the centroids.

The protest treatment is a binary term that incorporates measures of distance, time and event intensity. The distance measure is dichotomized and takes the value one if the distance is equal to or less than 100 miles and zero otherwise. As the model relies heavily on distance between counties and protest cities, only states in the continental U.S. are included. The time measure is also a dichotomized term that takes the value one if the number of days between the date of the protest and the date of the relevant November election between 1964 and 1972 is less than 730 days and zero otherwise. The last component of the protest treatment is an intensity measure that takes the value one if the protest includes 10 or more protesters (from the Olzak and West data) or 10 or more arrests (from the Carter data) and zero otherwise. For a given county i in a given year t , if the distance, time and intensity measures are all ones, then the protest treatment is assigned a value of one.

⁴I amend the Carter data to include one institutional protest in which violence occurs, the Attica prison uprising on September 9th, 1971. The results presented are robust to its exclusion.

Public opinion

Mass opinion data is from surveys conducted by different companies between 1950 and 1980 in which subjects were asked to identify the “most important problem” facing America. The data are collected in Niemi, Mueller, and Smith (1989) and slightly revised in Loo and Grimes (2004). Both the “civil rights” and “social control” measures combine multiple responses. For example, the “social control” category includes concern about crime, riots, and juvenile delinquency. For a critique of this composite measure, see Loo and Grimes (2004). Evidence suggests that many citizens conflated issues like violent protests and communist agitation so I use the composite measure without adjustment (Flamm 2005). The polls occur at irregular times and, for time series analyses, missing data are interpolated using a cubic spline.

Elite discourse

To measure elite discourse, I extract text from the Congressional Record between 1959 and 1973 to build a machine readable corpus and calculate the occurrence of certain keywords. This represents the official record of the debates for the 86th to the 92nd sessions of Congress. The corpus of text is preprocessed according to standard procedures. To estimate trends, I create two indices. The first index counts the number of daily mentions of the phrases “civil rights” and “voting rights”. The daily sum of the counts is called the “civil rights index”. The same method is used to calculate a “social control index” using the keywords “crime” and “riot” (this includes the term antiriot to account for proposed legislation).⁵

Voting

Voting behavior is measured as the county-level percentage of votes going to the Democratic party in presidential elections between 1964 and 1972. The county-level voting data is drawn from Clubb,

⁵More detail and scatter plots of the time series can be seen in Appendix Section 4 in Figures 12 and 13.

Flanigan, and Zingale (1986). I focus on vote-share as the outcome variable because it offers a reasonable proxy for attitudes towards black interests and indicates mass opinion and behavior. Following the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Democrats became the de facto party of African American voters (Carmines and Stimson 1990). According to data published by Bositis (2008, Table 1, p 8), between 1936 and 1960 black party identification with Democrats averaged about 52 percent. Between 1964 and 1972, black party identification with Democrats averaged 83 percent (see Figure 15 in Appendix Section 5 for more detail). Exit polls in 1964, 1968 and 1972 presidential elections put the “nonwhite” vote for the Democratic party at 94 percent, 85 percent and 87 percent, respectively (Gallup Organization 2016). At the same time, Republican and third party candidates like Barry Goldwater, Richard Nixon and George Wallace made explicit appeals to whites who resented or opposed to the Civil Rights Movement (Mendelberg 2001; Mayer 2002). As such, in this analysis, Democrats are understood to be the party most aligned with black interests and preferences.

Control Variables

Where appropriate, I control for a wide range of variables that influence voting and for which data was available across three county-level censuses in 1962, 1972 and 1983. County-level demographic variables include the percentage of the population that has at least a high school diploma; the percentage of the population that is black, and, to account for non-linearities in how the presence of African Americans in a county influences voting behavior, the same term squared;⁶ and the median age. To account for some of the institutional and population-level variation across counties, I include terms for the logged per capita expenditures by local government, the percentage of the county population that lives in an urban setting, the logged total population and the percent population growth. To account for economic factors, the county-level median income, percent of the population that is unemployed and the percentage of housing that is owner occupied. In keeping with prior literature on ethnic

⁶In the 1960 Census, this item is the percentage of the population that is “nonwhite.”

conflict and violent protests, I include a term for the percent of the county that is foreign born (Olzak and Shanahan 1996). Finally, a lagged term of the Democratic vote-share from the prior presidential election is included. Where the census year data from 1962, 1972 and 1983 does not correspond to election years, I use linear interpolation to estimate the relevant values for 1964, 1968 and 1972.

Empirical Strategy

The theory of leading from below makes three primary predictions. First, subordinate group protests are able to temporarily disrupt elite dominance of political communication to help set agendas. Second, the type of tactics employed by the subordinate group play a critical role in shaping whether the dominant group frames minority demands in terms of group conflict. Third, through their effects on agenda setting and framing, protests can increase or decrease ethnocentrism in the median dominant group member and, in turn, grow ethnocentric or egalitarian coalitions. To test the first prediction, I present plots of raw data to show the punctuated patterns of protest activity and changes in elite discourse and public opinion. I also present results from Granger causality tests that estimate whether trends in elite discourse, protest activity and public opinion are able to forecast one another. To test the second prediction that protest tactics by a subordinate group will have differential framing effects on the dominant group, I show that the the political consequences of disruption vary significantly by the type of protest tactic.

Finally, to investigate the third prediction that protest tactics will influence ethnocentrism in political coalitions, I use three methods to test for a relationship between disruption strategies and voting behavior. First, with county-level data, I use panel models with county- and year-fixed effects to control for any location- and time-invariant characteristics. Second, to account for possible confounders, I use various matching and weighting techniques to approximate treated and control groups that are similar on all observed covariates and assumed to be similar on unobserved covariates. Third, to further address endogeneity, I use rainfall in April, 1968 as an instrumental variable for violent protests.

The theory of “leading from below” makes specific predictions about the effects of subordinate group protests on dominant group voting behavior. Aggregate measures of county-level demographics and voting may not accurately reflect the individual-level behavior of white voters (King 1997). The hyper-segregation of Americans by race offers one solution to the ecological inference problem through a form of extreme case analysis (Duncan and Davis 1953). By limiting the statistical analysis to counties that are 90 percent white, county-level data on Democratic vote share serve as reasonably good estimates of individual-level white voting behavior.

Results

Are protesters leading from below?




Figure 2: Scatter plot of protest activity (left y -axis) and public opinion on ‘civil rights’ (right y -axis), 1960 to 1972. Vertical dashed lines are the dates of the 1964, 1968 and 1972 presidential elections. Data sources: Niemi, Mueller, and Smith (1989); Olzak and West (1995).

Figure 2 presents a scatter plot of nonviolent protest activity and public opinion on “civil rights” from 1960 to 1972. The left *y*-axis is the number of protesters per month participating in black-led nonviolent events and is represented by a small black circle. The right *y*-axis is the percentage of respondents in a national survey saying that ‘civil rights’ is the most important problem in America and is represented by the trend line. The data in Figure 2 suggest that public opinion on “civil rights” and black-led nonviolent protest activity move together during periods of mobilization, such as around the March on Washington (8/27/63) and the “Bloody Sunday” march in Selma, AL (3/7/65). Three other spikes in the public opinion time series occur at the same time as enactment of the 1960 Civil Rights Act (5/6/1960), the 1964 Civil Rights Act (7/2/1964) and the 1965 Voting Rights Act (8/6/65) also affirming more elite-centered models of public opinion.

Several elite theories suggest that presidential campaigns were critical in driving support for racial liberalism in the early 1960s and opposition in the latter part of the decade (Carmines and Stimson 1990; Zaller 1992; Weaver 2007). Figure 2 shows vertical dashed lines for dates of presidential elections between 1960 and 1972 and the trend in public opinion preceding a presidential election is either flat or declining. Based on these data, it does not appear that presidential candidates and campaigns are moving mass opinion on civil rights. In short, the patterns in Figure 2 offer suggestive but not conclusive evidence that both elite and subordinate group activity can shape public opinion.

Figure 3 presents a plot of violent protest activity for 752 incidents by month and year using data from Carter (1986) between 1964 and 1971 and Olzak and West (1995) for 1971 to 1972. Public opinion data are from Niemi, Mueller, and Smith (1989). The left-hand *y*-axis indicates the logged number of violent protest arrests per month and the right-hand *y*-axis and details what percent of those surveyed identified “social control” as the most important problem facing America. The measures not only follow similar year-over-year patterns, but also season-by-season with concern about “social control” rising in the summer and declining in the winter. These patterns suggest violent protest activity is correlated with a taste for “social control” among the predominantly white mass public. Contrary

Violent Protest Arrests and Public Opinion on 'Social Control,' 1964–1972




Figure 3: Scatter plot of logged violent protest arrests (left *y*-axis) and public opinion on ‘social control’ (right *y*-axis), 1964 to 1972. The ten uprisings in which more than 1,000 people were arrested are labeled with abbreviated city names. Vertical dashed lines are the dates of the 1964, 1968 and 1972 presidential elections. Data sources: Niemi, Mueller, and Smith (1989), protest data from 1964 to 1971: Carter (1986); 1971 to 1972: Olzak and West (1995).

to prior work emphasizing the role of presidential campaigns on the public salience of “social control” (Welch 1975; Carmines and Stimson 1990; Weaver 2007), survey respondents show no consistent trend before the presidential elections of the era.

Figure 4 presents a plot of the relationship between weekly violent protest activity and weekly Congressional speech mentioning the word “riot” or “antiriot.” The pattern in 1964 through 1967 shows an initial spike in violent protest activity followed immediately by a spike and decay in Congressional speech mentioning “riots.” During the week of March 3rd, 1968, the pattern is slightly different as Congress considers anti-riot legislation proposed by President Johnson. Johnson’s proposal fails to gain traction and Congressional discourse about “riots” quickly falls to baseline levels. On April 4th, 1968, Martin Luther King, Jr. was assassinated and violent protest activity then reached record levels. The




Figure 4: Line plot of weekly counts of Congressional speech using phrase “riot” or “antiriot” and weekly, black-led violent protest arrests (10s) from 1964 to 1972. Data sources: Congressional Record and Carter (1986).

following week, an anti-riot proposal backed by conservative legislators was incorporated into the 1968 Civil Rights Act which passed on April 11th.

To further assess whether time trends in protest activity or elite discourse might be predictive of public opinion in a later period (or vice versa), I apply bivariate Granger causality tests.⁷ With this test, I regress lagged values of X against present values of Y while also controlling for lagged values of Y (Granger 1981). If X exhibits a statistically significant relationship with Y , it is said to “Granger-cause” or forecast Y . First differences were taken to produce stationary time series (based on the results of KPSS tests). Figure 5 summarizes the results of 36 pairwise Granger tests (full results and additional detail available in the Appendix Section 6). The diagram on the left shows that trends in nonviolent

⁷Multivariate vector autoregression models with lags of one and two months produced similar results.




Figure 5: Two diagrams summarizing results of 36 Granger causality tests for relationships between elite discourse, protests and public opinion. Arrows point to which time series forecast other data. Asterisks indicate statistical significance (* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$). For more detail and full results, see Appendix Section 6. Data sources: (Olzak and West 1995) and Carter (1986).

protest activity are predictive of changes in elite discourse ($p < 0.001$) and that elite discourse about civil rights can forecast changes in public opinion on civil rights ($p < 0.01$).

The diagram on the right of Figure 5 presents the same relationships for violent protests and issues of social control like concern about “crime” and “riots.” For these Granger causality tests, trends in violent protest activity are predictive of trends in elite discourse ($p < 0.001$). Though Figure 3 suggests a strong relationship between trends in violent protest activity and public opinion on “social control,” the Granger causality tests fail to reject the null hypothesis that there is no relationship.⁸ None of the other time series appear to forecast trends in each other. In sum, the results of these Granger causality tests suggest that subordinate group protest activity can help set the agenda for political elites. Further, there is suggestive evidence from plots of raw data that subordinate group protest activity is setting the public agenda as observed in public opinion on issues of civil rights and “social control.”

⁸The failure to reject the null hypothesis in these tests should not be interpreted as evidence that the two trends are unrelated. For example, it might be that the two trends move together so closely that a lag of one or two months is insufficiently granular to detect how one trend predicts the other.

Did protests cause changes in voting behavior?

Having shown that protests are likely playing an important and independent role in commanding the attention of political elites and the broader public, my goal is to identify a causal effect of protests on voting for or against the more ethnocentric political coalition. To do so, I begin by estimating the following panel model:

$$DemShare_{i,t} = \beta_1 Protest_{i,t} + \beta_2 DemShare_{i,t-1} + \beta_x \mathbf{X}_{i,t} + \gamma_t + \mu_i + \epsilon_{i,t} \quad (I)$$

where $DemShare_{i,t}$ is the vote-share of Democratic party in county i in the election occurring in year t . $Protest_{i,t}$ is a binary indicator of whether county i experienced a protest in year t . For any given county-year, the protest “treatment” is calculated as a function of whether county i was within 100 miles of any protest that occurred within 730 days before the election in year t and exhibited a level of intensity in which at least 10 protesters participated (Olzak and West data) or were arrested (Carter data).⁹

Are protests exogenous to voting?

One concern with estimating causal effects of protests is that disruption activity might not occur at random. An early and substantial body of work in sociology found that black-led violent protest occurrence was highly idiosyncratic and the only consistent predictor was the presence of a black population (c.f., Spilerman 1976). More recent scholarship finds evidence that diffusion, movements organizations, black adult resources and ethnic competition may also influence where protests occurred (McAdam 1982; Carter 1986; Olzak and Shanahan 1996; Myers 2000; Andrews and Biggs 2006). Matching and weighting units are two approaches that can approximate random assignment with observational data by creating treated and control groups that look similar on all observed pre-treatment characteristics

⁹The findings are robust to reasonable alternate specifications of the distance, time and intensity thresholds.

and are assumed to be similar on all unobserved characteristics. This both reduces model dependence (Ho et al. 2011) and improves causal inference (Rubin 1974).

Matching with the time series, cross sectional data, however, poses a challenge in that each observation in this data is a county-year in which some units are systematically linked to one another. As the relevant unit of analysis is a county and peak protest activity is concentrated in time, one conceptually straightforward approximation is to match counties with similar pre-treatment covariates for a single peak year, discard unmatched counties and then run the panel model with the matched subset of counties across all time periods. I apply this approach assigning “treatment” and “control” categories to each county using the peak periods for nonviolent and violent protest, 1964 and 1968, respectively. Table 2 presents the summary statistics for the matched nonviolent protest data and shows that on observed pre-treatment covariates the “treated” and “control” categories are very similar. Similar levels of balance are observed in the data on violent protests (see Table 4 in the Appendix Section 2).

	Controls Mean	Controls SD	‘Treated’ Mean	Treated SD
% Black	0.05	0.09	0.05	0.10
% HS+ Educ	0.47	1.41	0.38	0.12
% Owner Occ Housing	0.64	0.06	0.65	0.07
% Pop Foreign	4.87	4.10	4.65	5.13
% Pop Growth	0.06	0.25	0.05	0.19
% Unemployment	0.05	0.03	0.05	0.02
% Urban	32.89	28.36	32.25	27.13
log(PC Local Gov Exp)	172.57	61.04	170.55	227.75
Median Age	29.84	5.13	31.21	4.68
Median Income	5503.73	1275.41	5502.13	1518.43
Lagged Pres vote-share	45.19	10.44	45.21	12.85
log(Population)	9.91	0.99	9.85	1.00
N	631.00		631.00	

Table 2: Summary statistics for county-level data in 1964 for nonviolent protests. The ‘treated’ counties were within 100 miles of a nonviolent protest that included 10 people between 1962 and 1964. Control counties did not experience black-led protests. Matching was done using nearest neighbor matching with a caliper.

Figure 6 presents the results of 12 panel models estimating the effect of protests on county-level Democratic vote share. The results indicate that moving from a county that was not exposed to nonviolent protest activity to one that was caused an approximately 0.9 percentage point increase in Democratic vote share ($p < 0.001$). Conversely, the results also suggest that moving from a county that was not exposed to black-led violent protest activity to one that was caused a 1.2 to 1.6 percentage point

decrease in Democratic vote share (both, $p < 0.001$). For the subset of counties which are at least 90% white in 1960 and for counties that are matched (or both), the effect of black-led protests on Democratic vote share hold. This suggests that the results presented in are not being driven by imbalance in the data or the model specification. For full regression results see Table 6 and Table 7 in Appendix Section 3.)




Figure 6: Coefficient plot presenting the estimated effect of protests on county-level Democratic vote share in the presidential elections of 1964, 1968 and 1972.

Did violent protests in April, 1968 cause a decline in Democratic vote share?

To further assess the robustness of these results, I estimate several additional models. Following Collins et al. (2004), I work with the subset of 137 violent protests recorded in the Carter data that occur following the assassination of Martin Luther King Jr. in April, 1968. To address possible bias introduced by heterogeneity of units, I estimate a variety of linear models with different matching and weighting methods. In addition, I use rainfall as an instrument for protest activity in April, 1968 and estimate the effect of violent protests with a two-stage least squares model. Figure 7 presents a choropleth plot of the counties within 100 miles of a violent protest that included at least 10 arrests.

The OLS, matched, weighted and instrumental variable (IV) models all take the form:

$$DemShare_i = \alpha + \beta_1 Protest_i + \beta_2 DemShare_{i,t=1964} + \beta_x \mathbf{X}_i + \epsilon_i \quad (2)$$

As in the panel model, $DemShare_i$ is the Democratic party vote-share in county i . Unlike the panel model, however, the only election of interest is the 1968 presidential election and, therefore, there is no year t subscript. For all but the IV model, $Protest_i$ is calculated as in the panel model except that only the 137 violent protests occurring in April, 1968 are included. The control variables are the same as in the panel model. For the IV model, in the first stage, $Protest_i$ is modeled as a function of average county-level rainfall in millimeters. For the second stage, the predicted values of the first stage are used as the $Protest_i$ ‘treatment’ to explain variation in county-level democratic vote share.¹⁰ As the most severe uprisings occur in the first few days following the assassination, I use more granular day-level rainfall data rather than rainfall for the whole month. The rainfall measures are taken from long-term daily precipitation records from the US Historical Climatology Network (Easterling et al. 1999).

OLS, matched & weighted models

Figure 8 presents six specifications of a linear model estimating the effect of 137 violent protests from April, 1968 on Democratic vote share in the November, 1968 presidential election. Models (1) and (2) use ordinary least squares without matching or weights. Models (3) and (4) use Mahalanobis distance matching (Ho et al. 2011). Models (5) and (6) use Covariate Balance Propensity Score weights (Imai and Ratkovic 2014).¹¹ All models use April, 1968 violent protest data from Carter (1986). The matched and weighted results in Models (3) and (5), respectively, suggest that for similarly situated counties, exposure to violent protest activity caused a decrease in Democratic vote share of about two percentage points (for all models, $p < 0.001$). For full regression results, see Table 8 in the Appendix Section 3.

¹⁰I do not conduct a similar analysis of nonviolent protests using the the Olzak et al. data as it includes only includes 18 black-led nonviolent protests in the four weeks following King’s assassination.

¹¹ To see the improvement in covariate balance, see Figure 16 in Appendix Section 7.





Figure 7: Choropleth map of estimated exposure to black-led violent protests following Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.'s assassination on April 4th, 1968.



Effect of Violent Protests on County-level Democratic Vote Share

Figure 8: Coefficient plot of estimated effects of violent protest in April, 1968 on county-level Democratic vote share in presidential election in November, 1968. Data source: Carter (1986).

Instrumental variable models

To further address concerns about endogeneity, I use rainfall in April, 1968 as an instrument to approximate random assignment of violent protests following the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. I use rainfall following other scholarship that finds bad weather decreases protest activity and public gatherings (Collins et al. 2004; Collins and Margo 2007; Madestam et al. 2013). Figure 9 presents

results of six two-stage least squares regressions in which cumulative county-level rainfall is used to predict violent protest activity and then the predicted violent protest activity is used to estimate shifts in Democratic vote-share.¹² Model (1) uses rainfall before Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. is assassinated on April 4th as a placebo test and suggests that the relationship between pre-assassination rainfall in April, 1968 and Democratic vote share in November, 1968 is not statistically distinguishable from zero. Model (3) uses rainfall for the week following the assassination in which about 95 percent of the protests occur and finds violent protests caused a significant negative shift in the county-level vote share of about -12.4 percentage points ($p < 0.001$).

Model (5) offers a second placebo test using rainfall in the period of April 11-30 when only 5 percent of protests occur and suggests there is no significant relationship between rainfall and voting in the absence of significant protest activity. The absence of a significant relationship between rainfall and Democratic vote share, except in the week in which 95 percent of protests occur, strongly suggests that other possible correlates of rainfall and voting, such as geography, are not driving the results. All models use data weighted with the CBPS-generated weights as calculated in column (5) of Table 8 and the results are robust to the absence of weighting. See Table 9 in Appendix Section 3 for the full results.

¹²To test for the possibility of a weak instrument, following Staiger and Stock (1997), I run a partial F -test comparing the first-stage model to a model without the rainfall variable. I also test for robustness to heteroskedasticity and clustering. The “rule-of-thumb” guideline is that F -statistics below 10 indicate a weak instrument. The F -statistics for the three tests, respectively, are: 36.78, 26.6, 22.62.




Figure 9: Coefficient plot of estimated effects of violent protest in April, 1968 on county-level Democratic vote share in presidential election in November, 1968. Martin Luther King, Jr. is assassinated April 4th, 1968. Data source: Carter (1986).

What were the political consequences of violent protests?

Additional evidence from other historical and public opinion sources suggests widespread concern among the mass public about crime and disorder. Weaver (2007) notes that Members of Congress were deluged with “torrents of constituent mail” in favor the 1968 Safe Streets bill and that even liberal Democrats “felt compelled by public anxiety over crime and riots to vote for the bill” (257). Polling data from August, 1968 finds 81 percent of respondents agreed with the statement “Law and order has broken down in this country” (Louis Harris and Associates, Inc. 1968).

Humphrey Gains	# of Electoral Votes	# of Outcomes	% of Outcomes
NJ, OH	234	6	0
DE, NJ, OH	237	51	1
MO, NJ, OH	246	37	0
DE, MO, NJ, OH	249	203	2
IL, NJ, OH	260	210	2
DE, IL, NJ, OH	263	1,486	15
IL, MO, NJ, OH	272	954	10
DE, IL, MO, NJ, OH	275	7,053	71

Table 3: Results of 10,000 counterfactual simulated elections with effect of violent protests on Democratic vote share estimated at -1.97.

Figure 3 presents the expected allocation of electoral votes in the 1968 presidential election under the counterfactual scenario that Martin Luther King Jr. had not been assassinated on April 4th, 1968

and 137 violent protests had not occurred in the immediate wake of his death. To estimate this counterfactual, I simulate the 1968 election 10,000 times assuming no violent protests in April, 1968. For each county exposed to violent protest activity, I estimate a counterfactual county-level Democratic vote share assuming Humphrey gained share at Nixon's expense. For each run of the simulation, the county-level Democratic vote share is estimated as the observed vote share plus, if the county was exposed to protest activity, some additional share under the assumption that the absence of protests would result in Democratic gains. The estimated increase is drawn from a random normal distribution with a mean of the original Democratic vote share plus 1.97 percentage points and a standard deviation of 0.25.¹³ I then calculate the estimated change in the number of Democratic votes in each county and aggregate the counterfactual vote totals to estimate the state-level vote totals and, ultimately, the winner of the state's electoral votes. Across the simulations there are eight unique outcomes (see Table 3) and Humphrey wins in 8,007 out of 10,000 or about 80 percent of the simulations.

Under this counterfactual scenario, I estimate that Humphrey would have won an additional 705,418 votes nationally (95% credible interval: 730,834, 808,639) and, in the modal outcome, a majority of the votes in five additional states: Delaware, Illinois, Missouri, New Jersey, and Ohio. These swing states would collectively have provided Humphrey with an additional 84 electoral votes and allowed him to win the 1968 election with a total of 275 electoral votes.¹⁴

Figure 10 presents a map of the allocation of electoral votes in the 1968 presidential election under the counterfactual scenario of Martin Luther King Jr. not being assassinated and 137 violent protests not occurring in the wake of his death. As can be seen in Figure 10, none of the states Humphrey is estimated to pick up in the modal counterfactual scenario (i.e., Delaware, Illinois, Missouri, New Jersey, and Ohio) are Southern. While Nixon is widely credited with having won the 1968 election with a "Southern Strategy," in 1968 the third party candidacy of George Wallace carried the deep south. Had Wallace been less competitive, it is exceedingly unlikely that racial conservatives in the

¹³I estimate these parameters by taking the mean of the two coefficients and standard errors, respectively, from matched data in Models (3) and (5) in Table 8.

¹⁴With Wallace assumed to retain 46 electoral votes from the deep south, Humphrey needs at least 247 electoral votes to tie and 270 to win. Alaska, Hawaii and the District of Columbia are assumed to remain unchanged.




Figure 10: Choropleth map of the 1968 United States presidential election with electoral votes allocated under the counterfactual scenario of Martin Luther King, Jr. not being assassinated and 137 uprisings not occurring in the wake of his death.

south would have switched to Humphrey who was the lead sponsor and author of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Had Nixon carried more southern states, simulations still suggest that the regions with the potential to swing between Humphrey and Nixon were in the Midwest and Mid-Atlantic. Echoing Rustin (1965), in 1964, nonviolent protests helped to grow the egalitarian coalition of white liberals, white moderates and blacks to help the Democratic party win the presidency decisively. In 1968, violent protests contributed to a split in that coalition that pulled white moderates from the Midwest and Mid-Atlantic into the ethnocentric coalition and helped tip the presidency to the Republican party.

Conclusion

This article presents the first systematic analysis of protest tactics on public opinion, elite discourse and voting behavior with particular attention to causal identification. While strong research designs have shown effects of terrorism on voting (Berrebi and Klor 2008; Getmansky and Zeitzoff 2014, c.f.) and protests on social policy (Fording 1997), and economic development (Collins and Margo 2007), I believe this is the first article to establish a causal effect of protests on voting. The theory and results in this article suggest that subordinate groups, not just elites, through strategic disruption and choice of

tactics, can help shape national agendas and frame demands in ways that grow egalitarian or ethnocratic coalitions.

Critically, in the case of the 1960s black freedom struggle, these results suggest that nothing in the contest between the egalitarian and ethnocratic coalitions was inevitable. These findings suggest that the “transformative egalitarian” coalition identified by Rustin (1965), King and Smith (2005) and others was fragile but, in the absence of violent protests, would likely have won the presidential election of 1968. In this counterfactual scenario, the United States would have elected Hubert Humphrey rather than Richard Nixon and, in the absence of white antipathy to black uprisings, the ethnocratic coalition would not have carried the day.

A few caveats are also worth noting. As previously stated, disruption likely leads to “carrots” and “sticks” from political leaders. Among elites, though not masses, there is some evidence that violent protests can contribute to more generous social policy (e.g., Skrentny 1996; Fording 1997). Some work on effects of political violence also suggests non-linear or U-shaped relationships between disruption and political outcomes such that small “doses” potentially lead to beneficial outcomes and large “doses” lead to more repression (Berrebi and Klor 2008). The results on political violence presented here draw inferences from a period in which 750 black-led protests escalated to violence but it is entirely possible that fewer violent protests by a subordinate group might produce substantively different or null effects. Also, while many dynamics of ethnic conflict are likely to be similar across regime types, this theory and evidence addresses protests in ethnically heterogeneous democratic (or semi-democratic) states like Britain, Brazil, India and Israel and may not generalize to more homogenous democracies or authoritarian governments. That said, almost all democracies now face growing levels of migration and immigration that contribute to greater ethnic heterogeneity, hierarchy and contestation.

Around the world, subordinate group activists confronting powerful dominant groups face difficult choices about whether and how to assert their interests. Nonviolent methods can grow sympathetic coalitions but may also result in humiliation, injury and death at the hands of police, soldiers and vigilantes. Violent tactics can directly counter repression and capture the attention of elites but risk alienating allies and provoking even greater social control. In the 1960s, African American activists and thinkers deliberated over both strategies. Ella Baker and Bayard Rustin helped organize nonviolent civil disobedience while Malcolm X argued, “I don’t call it violence when it’s self-defense, I call it intelligence” (Ransby 2003; Rustin 1965; Malcolm X 1965). A substantial body of work in political science suggests

we should expect no meaningful political consequences to follow protests. The results of this article suggest that statistical minorities in stratified democracies can overcome structural bias to influence elites, sway public opinion and win at the ballot box. Tactics matter, however, and while violence in response to repression is often justifiable, this research suggest it may not be strategic.

Appendix

I Scatter plot of black-led protest activity, 1960 to 1972

As can be seen in Figure 11, black-led nonviolent protest activity reached unprecedented levels in the early to mid-1960s and then, toward the latter half of the decade, more than 750 events escalated to include protester-initiated violence. At the same time, public opinion and policy preferences among the white majority on issues related to race swung rapidly across time and region, from indifference to concern about civil rights to anxiety about “social control.”




Figure 11: Scatter plot of protest activity, 1960 to 1972. by whether protesters were nonviolent (top panel) or engaged in some violence (bottom panel). Note the y -axis for nonviolent protests is about 10 times the scale of the y -axis for violent protests. Trend lines are Loess curves. Data: Olzak and West (1995).

2 Summary statistics of matched counties with violent protest

	Controls Mean	Controls SD	'Treated' Mean	Treated SD
% Black	0.09	0.13	0.09	0.15
% HS+ Educ	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.12
% Owner Occ Housing	0.68	0.06	0.69	0.08
% Pop Foreign	6.16	6.19	6.35	6.44
% Pop Growth	0.04	0.19	0.06	0.18
% Unemployment	0.05	0.02	0.04	0.02
% Urban	33.32	27.87	33.31	27.07
log(PC Local Gov Exp)	188.33	69.13	197.88	84.48
Median Age	29.70	5.19	30.68	4.75
Median Income	6334.90	1503.75	6922.29	1601.44
Lagged Pres vote-share	57.09	12.70	57.33	11.15
log(Population)	9.91	1.03	9.92	1.06
N	838.00		838.00	

Table 4: Summary statistics for county-level data in 1960. The 'treated' counties were within 100 miles of a violent protest (Olzak data) that included at least 10 arrests between 1966 and 1968. Control counties did not experience black-led protests. Matching was done using nearest neighbor matching with a caliper.

	Controls Mean	Controls SD	'Treated' Mean	Treated SD
% Black	0.08	0.12	0.10	0.15
% HS+ Educ	0.45	0.49	0.42	0.13
% Owner Occ Housing	0.69	0.06	0.68	0.08
% Pop Foreign	7.00	6.54	6.06	6.55
% Pop Growth	0.04	0.19	0.08	0.20
% Unemployment	0.05	0.02	0.05	0.02
% Urban	33.05	28.56	33.86	27.10
log(PC Local Gov Exp)	192.71	72.69	193.02	81.40
Median Age	30.25	5.41	29.88	4.64
Median Income	6394.74	1422.45	6872.32	1779.05
Lagged Pres vote-share	58.55	11.74	56.47	11.28
log(Population)	9.91	1.04	10.01	1.07
N	629.00		857.00	

Table 5: Summary statistics for county-level data in 1960. The 'treated' counties were within 100 miles of a violent protest (Carter data) that included at least 10 arrests between 1966 and 1968. Control counties did not experience black-led protests. Matching was done using nearest neighbor matching with a caliper.

3 Regression Tables

Table 6: Panel Models of Effect of Protests on County-level Democratic Presidential Vote-share, 1964-1972.

	DV: County-level Democratic Presidential vote-share					
	Nonviolent Protests (Olzak data)		Violent Protests (Olzak data)		Violent Protests (Carter data)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Protest 'Treatment'	0.88*** (0.13)	0.74*** (0.13)	-1.23*** (0.13)	-1.21*** (0.13)	-1.65*** (0.10)	-1.01*** (0.09)
log(PC Local Gov Exp)	-6.51*** (1.51)	-10.39*** (2.57)	-6.14*** (1.45)	-9.98*** (2.47)	-6.21*** (1.53)	-9.90*** (2.56)
% HS+ Educ	0.25 (0.15)	0.32*** (0.05)	0.23 (0.14)	0.31*** (0.05)	0.22 (0.13)	0.30*** (0.05)
% Black	105.24** (39.25)	-128.78 (110.96)	98.06* (38.82)	-139.55 (109.86)	97.98* (38.95)	-147.86 (109.74)
(% Black) ²	-224.71*** (54.76)	2,457.31* (968.96)	-218.77*** (53.76)	2,382.56* (963.64)	-225.12*** (55.77)	2,459.43* (957.04)
Median Age	-0.59** (0.18)	-1.35*** (0.18)	-0.54** (0.18)	-1.28*** (0.18)	-0.73*** (0.18)	-1.40*** (0.18)
Median Income (oos)	-4.38*** (0.25)	-4.40*** (0.37)	-4.61*** (0.24)	-4.60*** (0.36)	-4.54*** (0.25)	-4.55*** (0.37)
% Unemployment	234.90*** (20.71)	147.86*** (20.19)	228.51*** (20.50)	139.23*** (20.01)	204.84*** (20.21)	135.16*** (19.79)
% Urban	-0.20*** (0.03)	-0.06* (0.03)	-0.19*** (0.03)	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.13*** (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)
log(Population)	0.38 (2.16)	1.10 (2.36)	0.69 (2.14)	1.45 (2.34)	1.51 (2.08)	1.90 (2.31)
% Owner Occ Housing	-109.47*** (6.38)	-89.83*** (6.75)	-107.53*** (6.35)	-88.04*** (6.62)	-103.00*** (6.16)	-88.10*** (6.66)
% Pop Growth	4.80** (1.54)	4.76** (1.76)	4.30** (1.52)	4.03* (1.74)	3.82* (1.52)	4.32* (1.74)
% Pop Foreign	0.38*** (0.06)	0.61*** (0.08)	0.42*** (0.06)	0.65*** (0.08)	0.42*** (0.06)	0.65*** (0.08)
Lagged Pres vote-share	-0.35*** (0.01)	-0.51*** (0.01)	-0.34*** (0.01)	-0.49*** (0.01)	-0.32*** (0.01)	-0.49*** (0.01)
County & year fixed effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
County at least 90% white?	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	8,923	6,569	8,923	6,569	8,923	6,569
R ²	0.74	0.81	0.74	0.82	0.75	0.82

Note:

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Models (1) through (4) use data from Olzak and West (1995) and the protest 'treatment' is calculated as a function of the estimated number of participants in the protest. Models (5) and (6) uses data from Carter (1986) and the protest 'treatment' is calculated as a function of estimated number of people arrested in the violent protest. Models (1), (3) and (5) use data from all counties. Models (2), (4) and (6) only include counties that are at least 90 percent white. All models use county- and year-fixed effects (not shown) and robust and clustered standard errors.

Table 7: Matched County Panel Models of Effect of Protests on County-level Democratic Presidential Vote-share, 1964-1972.

DV: County-level Democratic Presidential vote-share						
	Nonviolent Protests (Olzak data)		Violent Protests (Olzak data)		Violent Protests (Carter data)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Protest 'Treatment'	0.80*** (0.17)	0.81*** (0.17)	-0.75*** (0.17)	-0.80*** (0.15)	-1.41*** (0.14)	-0.98*** (0.13)
log(PC Local Gov Exp)	-8.12* (3.27)	-10.45* (4.22)	-9.27*** (1.60)	-13.84*** (1.85)	-9.14*** (1.74)	-7.34* (3.57)
% HS+ Educ	0.32*** (0.05)	0.34*** (0.04)	0.31*** (0.09)	0.32*** (0.04)	0.30*** (0.08)	0.32*** (0.04)
% Black	72.83 (53.98)	39.91 (195.83)	105.33* (49.82)	-9.98 (180.04)	70.94 (45.80)	-172.00 (159.99)
(% Black) ²	-103.91* (48.56)	-259.60 (1,905.44)	-199.32*** (54.42)	1,347.26 (1,924.10)	-138.70** (43.02)	2,956.34* (1,377.45)
Median Age	-1.14*** (0.26)	-1.58*** (0.26)	-0.39 (0.22)	-1.24*** (0.23)	-0.61** (0.22)	-1.47*** (0.25)
Median Income (000s)	-4.68*** (0.51)	-4.76*** (0.63)	-4.44*** (0.29)	-4.68*** (0.33)	-4.42*** (0.30)	-5.48*** (0.52)
% Unemployment	204.06*** (26.88)	155.79*** (29.29)	241.06*** (26.94)	171.55*** (25.92)	229.55*** (25.47)	151.91*** (28.04)
% Urban	-0.14** (0.04)	-0.10* (0.05)	-0.24*** (0.04)	-0.12** (0.04)	-0.23*** (0.04)	-0.07 (0.04)
log(Population)	-3.45 (3.09)	-2.38 (3.44)	-0.72 (2.95)	-5.18 (3.46)	0.40 (2.86)	-1.08 (2.98)
% Owner Occ Housing	-103.15*** (9.73)	-76.99*** (9.68)	-107.94*** (8.00)	-75.00*** (7.46)	-98.45*** (7.95)	-77.56*** (7.86)
% Pop Growth	6.73** (2.14)	2.40 (2.46)	4.95* (2.05)	6.28** (2.04)	4.17* (2.10)	5.09** (1.96)
% Pop Foreign	0.74*** (0.15)	0.73*** (0.16)	0.62*** (0.10)	0.96*** (0.09)	0.47*** (0.11)	0.94*** (0.10)
Lagged Pres vote-share	-0.45*** (0.02)	-0.53*** (0.02)	-0.36*** (0.02)	-0.54*** (0.02)	-0.34*** (0.02)	-0.52*** (0.02)
County & year fixed effects?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
County at least 90% white?	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	3,746	3,294	4,908	3,584	4,699	3,279
R ²	0.78	0.80	0.75	0.81	0.76	0.82

Note:

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Models (1) through (4) use data from Olzak and West (1995) and the protest 'treatment' is calculated as a function of the estimated number of participants in the protest. Models (5) and (6) uses data from Carter (1986) and the protest 'treatment' is calculated as a function of estimated number of people arrested in the violent protest. Models (1), (3) and (5) use a matched subset of all counties. Models (2), (4) and (6) use matched subsets of counties that are at least 90 percent white. All models use county- and year-fixed effects (not shown) and robust and clustered standard errors.

Table 8: OLS Models of April, 1968 Protests on Democratic Vote-share

	DV: County-level Democratic Presidential Vote-share					
	OLS		Mahalanobis		CBPS	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Protest 'Treatment'	-2.06*** (0.26)	-1.71*** (0.27)	-1.76*** (0.26)	-1.50*** (0.29)	-2.19*** (0.23)	-1.77*** (0.23)
log(PC Local Gov Exp)	-0.32 (0.41)	0.31 (0.43)	-2.84*** (0.47)	-2.04** (0.63)	-1.36*** (0.38)	-0.47 (0.44)
% HS+ Educ	0.42 (0.51)	-0.01 (0.40)	15.64*** (1.85)	11.31*** (2.35)	2.07** (0.70)	0.06 (0.54)
% Black	-32.53*** (2.35)	-33.84 (31.12)	-28.01*** (2.50)	-61.93 (36.55)	-30.88*** (2.28)	-79.77** (30.55)
(% Black) ²	106.14*** (4.17)	-326.58 (702.70)	102.90*** (4.34)	80.92 (826.44)	102.15*** (3.90)	352.63 (700.06)
Median Age	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.04)	0.0003 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)
Median Income (000s)	60.25 (756.26)	650.75 (751.92)	-1,579.79 (977.26)	244.71 (1,212.89)	1,208.93 (755.23)	1,904.76* (740.84)
% Unemployment	57.13*** (5.63)	27.74*** (5.40)	67.14*** (7.18)	39.71*** (8.56)	60.75*** (5.98)	37.91*** (5.71)
% Urban	0.04*** (0.01)	0.02*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)
log(Population)	13.22*** (1.50)	12.13*** (1.56)	13.86*** (1.82)	12.60*** (2.52)	13.10*** (1.54)	12.21*** (1.60)
% Owner Occ Housing	0.90 (1.80)	0.56 (2.12)	6.36** (2.04)	3.07 (3.21)	-1.16 (1.90)	-4.78* (2.21)
% Pop Growth	-8.72*** (0.73)	-6.28*** (0.80)	-11.60*** (0.85)	-10.21*** (1.20)	-11.53*** (0.77)	-7.99*** (0.85)
% Pop Foreign	0.37*** (0.02)	0.26*** (0.02)	0.41*** (0.03)	0.25*** (0.03)	0.36*** (0.02)	0.25*** (0.02)
Lagged Pres vote-share	0.47*** (0.01)	0.80*** (0.01)	0.45*** (0.01)	0.75*** (0.01)	0.45*** (0.01)	0.75*** (0.01)
County at least 90% white?	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	3,091	1,868	2,680	1,226	3,091	1,868
R ²	0.70	0.80	0.71	0.78	0.70	0.80

Note:

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Models (1) and (2) use ordinary least squares without matching or weights. Models (3) and (4) use Mahalanobis distance matching. Models (5) and (6) use Covariate Balance Propensity Score weights. Models (1), (3) and (5) use data from all available counties. Models (2), (4) and (6) only include counties that are at least 90 percent white. All models use April, 1968 violent protest data from Carter (1986).

Table 9: Instrumental Variable Models of April, 1968 Protests on Democratic Vote-share

DV: County-level Democratic Presidential Vote-share						
	Placebo (Rain Apr 1-3)		Week (Apr 4-10)		Placebo (Apr 11-30)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Protest 'Treatment'	-3.90 (7.49)	0.74 (18.28)	-12.43*** (3.09)	-17.12* (6.83)	-74.54 (75.12)	24.96 (18.83)
log(PC Local Gov Exp)	-1.42 (0.81)	-1.31 (1.33)	-1.14 (0.74)	-0.34 (0.92)	0.91 (4.60)	-2.63 (2.98)
% HS+ Educ	1.50 (2.93)	1.26 (4.09)	-0.93 (0.97)	-2.43 (1.82)	-18.63 (25.05)	6.26 (6.58)
% Black	-32.68*** (4.48)	-76.73*** (21.81)	-31.65*** (5.10)	-80.02* (38.44)	-24.17 (20.72)	-72.27 (52.85)
(% Black) ²	104.70*** (10.39)	353.47 (370.17)	105.25*** (11.88)	131.62 (487.74)	109.28** (36.35)	654.44 (688.64)
Median Age	0.04 (0.04)	0.0001 (0.14)	0.05 (0.05)	0.13 (0.08)	0.16 (0.26)	-0.17 (0.16)
Median Income (000s)	0.40* (0.19)	0.56 (0.30)	0.40 (0.20)	0.33 (0.27)	0.43 (1.07)	0.87 (0.61)
% Unemployment	63.92*** (9.80)	46.48*** (7.92)	58.26*** (10.77)	46.63*** (13.28)	17.07 (64.33)	46.28* (22.23)
% Urban	0.04*** (0.01)	0.03 (0.02)	0.03** (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.08)	0.05 (0.03)
log(Population)	1.28** (0.40)	0.98 (1.93)	1.64*** (0.31)	2.88*** (0.81)	4.28 (3.37)	-1.59 (2.15)
% Owner Occ Housing	-0.37 (2.67)	-5.69* (2.84)	-1.31 (3.12)	-6.27 (4.30)	-8.18 (15.80)	-4.90 (7.85)
% Pop Growth	-11.67*** (1.32)	-9.76*** (2.55)	-10.57*** (1.19)	-7.64*** (1.65)	-2.58 (10.78)	-12.65*** (3.56)
% Pop Foreign	0.35*** (0.05)	0.29 (0.16)	0.30*** (0.04)	0.14* (0.07)	-0.07 (0.48)	0.50** (0.17)
Lagged Pres vote-share	0.48*** (0.02)	0.72*** (0.04)	0.48*** (0.02)	0.75*** (0.03)	0.52*** (0.09)	0.67*** (0.06)
South	2.22* (0.96)	-2.42 (2.83)	1.92 (1.14)	-0.51 (2.95)	-0.27 (4.66)	-5.01 (3.86)
County at least 90% white?	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes

Note:

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Each model uses county-level cumulative rainfall in April, 1968 to instrument for violent protest activity. Models (1) and (2) use rainfall before Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. is assassinated as a placebo test. Models (3) and (4) use rainfall in the week that follows Dr. King's the assassination in which about 95 percent of the protests occur. Models (5) and (6) offer a second placebo test by using rainfall in the period of April 11-30 when only 5 percent of protests occur. All models use data matched with CBPS weights as calculated in Table 8. Models (1), (3) and (5) use data from all available counties. Models (2), (4) and (6) only include counties that are at least 90 percent white. All models use April, 1968 violent protest data from Carter (1986).

4 Trends in Elite Discourse from Congressional Record

To account for varying document length, the same analyses were run with the daily counts divided by the number of mentions of the common word “committee”. As the results were similar, I use the raw count rather than ratio as it is more easily interpreted.




Figure 12: Scatter plot of keyword counts of Congressional use of terms “crime” and “riot”, aggregated by week, in Congressional Record between 1959 and 1973.




Figure 13: Scatter plot of keyword counts of Congressional use of terms “civil rights” and “voting rights”, aggregated by week, in Congressional Record between 1959 and 1973.




Figure 14: Line plot of weekly trends in Congressional speech about ‘civil rights’ and ‘voting rights’ and weekly trends in black-led nonviolent protest activity between 1959 and 1972. Data for nonviolent protests from Olzak and West (1995) and data on Congressional speech from the Congressional Record.

5 Black party identification, 1936-2012




Figure 15: Scatter plot of black party identification, 1936 to 2012. Lines drawn with Loess smoothing function.

6 Granger causality tests of elite discourse, protests and public opinion

Figure 5 in the main text summarizes the results of six pairwise Granger causality tests investigating whether time series on elite discourse, protest activity and public opinion can be used to forecast each other. Below are the full results for all relevant tests including comparisons using data on violent protests from two different sources (Olzak and West 1995; Carter 1986). The tests are divided across two topics: civil rights and social control. More narrowly, within each topic, there are three time series. For civil rights, the data are keyword counts in the Congressional Record of “civil rights” and “voting rights” (divided by the keyword count for “committee” to account for varying document length), public opinion on “civil rights” and black-led nonviolent protest activity. For social control, the three time series are elite discourse on “crime” and “riots”, public opinion on “social control” and black-led violent protest activity (again, replicated with two protest data sets). In addition, each test is conducted to see if either or both are predictive of the other (e.g., does X forecast Y and/or does Y forecast X).

Granger causality tests require that the data within are collected on the same time scale. Protest data and elite discourse data were collected on a daily basis and public opinion data were recorded by month. Consequently, for all tests data were aggregated to the month. In addition, all of the time series have some missing data. The public opinion data were collected at irregular frequencies. The Congressional Record and protest data have periods in which no activity were recorded (which can be interpreted as missing data or an observation of zero activity). A variety of substitution methods including listwise deletion, simple imputation of means or zero values, linear interpolation, and cubic spline interpolation were tested. These results use cubic spline interpolation to allow for smoother,

non-linear trends.¹⁵ The main finding, that protest activity forecasts elite discourse, is robust across the different methods. Interpolation methods that impute a static value in to missing public opinion data, such as using a simple mean, suggest nonviolent protests may Granger-cause public opinion on civil rights ($p < 0.0001$). This result is not reported in the main findings as the result is sensitive to the interpolation method. First differences were taken for all time series to transform them into stationary series (as indicated by KPSS tests). All tests were conducted with lags of both one and two periods. The summary results in Figure 5 present the more statistically significant result from either of the one or two month lagged tests.

6.1 Nonviolent protest activity \Leftrightarrow Public opinion on civil rights

	Res.Df	Df	F	Pr(>F)
1	148			
2	149	-1	1.80	0.1822

Table 10: Does nonviolent protest activity Granger-cause public opinion about civil rights? We fail to reject the null hypothesis ($p > 0.05$, lag of one month).

	Res.Df	Df	F	Pr(>F)
1	145			
2	147	-2	2.45	0.0896

Table 11: Does nonviolent protest activity Granger-cause public opinion about civil rights? We fail to reject the null hypothesis ($p > 0.05$, lag of two months).

	Res.Df	Df	F	Pr(>F)
1	148			
2	149	-1	0.76	0.3840

Table 12: Does public opinion about civil rights Granger-cause nonviolent protest activity? We fail to reject the null hypothesis ($p > 0.05$, lag of one month).

¹⁵A few observations are interpolated to have values below zero which are not meaningful for these data. Measures interpolated with a negative value are replaced with a zero value. This has no effect on the results.

	Res.Df	Df	F	Pr(>F)
1	145			
2	147	-2	0.54	0.5854

Table 13: Does public opinion about civil rights Granger-cause nonviolent protest activity? We fail to reject the null hypothesis ($p > 0.05$, lag of two months).

6.2 Nonviolent protest \Leftrightarrow Elite discourse on civil rights

	Res.Df	Df	F	Pr(>F)
1	149			
2	150	-1	0.30	0.5853

Table 14: Does nonviolent protest activity Granger-cause elite discourse about civil rights? We fail to reject the null hypothesis ($p > 0.05$, lag of one month).

	Res.Df	Df	F	Pr(>F)
1	146			
2	148	-2	5.26	0.0062

Table 15: Does nonviolent protest activity Granger-cause elite discourse about civil rights? We reject the null hypothesis ($p < 0.01$, lag of two months).

	Res.Df	Df	F	Pr(>F)
1	149			
2	150	-1	0.95	0.3314

Table 16: Does elite discourse about civil rights Granger-cause nonviolent protest activity? We fail to reject the null hypothesis ($p > 0.05$, lag of one month).

	Res.Df	Df	F	Pr(>F)
1	146			
2	148	-2	0.55	0.5758

Table 17: Does elite discourse about civil rights Granger-cause nonviolent protest activity? We fail to reject the null hypothesis ($p > 0.05$, lag of two months).

6.3 Elite discourse on civil rights \Leftrightarrow Public opinion on civil rights

	Res.Df	Df	F	Pr(>F)
1	148			
2	149	-1	4.93	0.0279

Table 18: Does elite discourse about civil rights Granger-cause public opinion about civil rights? We reject the null hypothesis ($p < 0.05$, lag of one month).

	Res.Df	Df	F	Pr(>F)
1	145			
2	147	-2	6.43	0.0021

Table 19: Does elite discourse about civil rights Granger-cause public opinion about civil rights? We reject the null hypothesis ($p < 0.01$, lag of two months).

	Res.Df	Df	F	Pr(>F)
1	148			
2	149	-1	3.10	0.0804

Table 20: Does public opinion about civil rights Granger-cause elite discourse about civil rights? We fail to reject the null hypothesis ($p > 0.05$, lag of one month).

	Res.Df	Df	F	Pr(>F)
1	145			
2	147	-2	1.52	0.2228

Table 21: Does public opinion about civil rights Granger-cause elite discourse about civil rights? We fail to reject the null hypothesis ($p > 0.05$, lag of two months).

6.4 Violent protest (Olzak and West data) \Leftrightarrow Public opinion on social control

	Res.Df	Df	F	Pr(>F)
1	148			
2	149	-1	0.04	0.8507

Table 22: Does violent protest activity (Olzak and West data) Granger-cause public opinion about social control? We fail to reject the null hypothesis ($p > 0.05$, lag of one month).

	Res.Df	Df	F	Pr(>F)
1	145			
2	147	-2	0.02	0.9764

Table 23: Does violent protest activity (Olzak and West data) Granger-cause public opinion about social control? We fail to reject the null hypothesis ($p > 0.05$, lag of two months).

	Res.Df	Df	F	Pr(>F)
1	148			
2	149	-1	1.28	0.2590

Table 24: Does public opinion about social control Granger-cause violent protest activity (Olzak and West data)? We fail to reject the null hypothesis ($p > 0.05$, lag of one month).

	Res.Df	Df	F	Pr(>F)
1	145			
2	147	-2	0.95	0.3890

Table 25: Does public opinion about social control Granger-cause violent protest activity (Olzak and West data)? We fail to reject the null hypothesis ($p > 0.05$, lag of two months).

6.5 Violent protest (Carter data) \Leftrightarrow Public opinion on social control

	Res.Df	Df	F	Pr(>F)
1	89			
2	90	-1	0.00	0.9650

Table 26: Does violent protest activity (Carter data) Granger-cause public opinion about social control? We fail to reject the null hypothesis ($p > 0.05$, lag of one month).

	Res.Df	Df	F	Pr(>F)
1	86			
2	88	-2	0.09	0.9175

Table 27: Does violent protest activity (Carter data) Granger-cause public opinion about social control? We fail to reject the null hypothesis ($p > 0.05$, lag of two months).

	Res.Df	Df	F	Pr(>F)
1	89			
2	90	-1	0.45	0.5054

Table 28: Does public opinion about social control Granger-cause violent protest activity (Carter data)? We fail to reject the null hypothesis ($p > 0.05$, lag of one month).

	Res.Df	Df	F	Pr(>F)
1	86			
2	88	-2	0.48	0.6199

Table 29: Does public opinion about social control Granger-cause violent protest activity (Carter data)? We fail to reject the null hypothesis ($p > 0.05$, lag of two months).

6.6 Elite discourse on social control \Leftrightarrow Public opinion on social control

	Res.Df	Df	F	Pr(>F)
1	148			
2	149	-1	0.08	0.7815

Table 30: Does elite discourse about crime and riots Granger-cause public opinion about social control? We fail to reject the null hypothesis ($p > 0.05$, lag of one month).

	Res.Df	Df	F	Pr(>F)
1	145			
2	147	-2	1.19	0.3076

Table 31: Does elite discourse about crime and riots Granger-cause public opinion about social control? We fail to reject the null hypothesis ($p > 0.05$, lag of two months).

	Res.Df	Df	F	Pr(>F)
1	148			
2	149	-1	0.49	0.4863

Table 32: Does public opinion about social control Granger-cause elite discourse about crime and riots? We fail to reject the null hypothesis ($p > 0.05$, lag of one month).

	Res.Df	Df	F	Pr(>F)
1	145			
2	147	-2	0.40	0.6714

Table 33: Does public opinion about social control Granger-cause elite discourse about crime and riots? We fail to reject the null hypothesis ($p > 0.05$, lag of two months).

6.7 Violent protest (Olzak and West data) \Leftrightarrow Elite discourse on social control

	Res.Df	Df	F	Pr(>F)
1	148			
2	149	-1	25.69	0.0000

Table 34: Does violent protest activity (Olzak and West data) Granger-cause elite discourse about crime and riots? We reject the null hypothesis ($p < 0.0001$, lag of one month).

	Res.Df	Df	F	Pr(>F)
1	145			
2	147	-2	14.10	0.0000

Table 35: Does violent protest activity (Olzak and West data) Granger-cause elite discourse about crime and riots? We reject the null hypothesis ($p < 0.0001$, lag of two months).

	Res.Df	Df	F	Pr(>F)
1	148			
2	149	-1	3.62	0.0591

Table 36: Does elite discourse about crime and riots Granger-cause violent protest activity (Olzak and West data)? We fail to reject the null hypothesis ($p > 0.05$, lag of one month).

	Res.Df	Df	F	Pr(>F)
1	145			
2	147	-2	1.82	0.1664

Table 37: Does elite discourse about crime and riots Granger-cause violent protest activity (Olzak and West data)? We fail to reject the null hypothesis ($p > 0.05$, lag of two months).

6.8 Violent protest (Carter data) \Leftrightarrow Elite discourse on social control

	Res.Df	Df	F	Pr(>F)
1	89			
2	90	-1	50.53	0.0000

Table 38: Does violent protest activity (Carter data) Granger-cause elite discourse about crime and riots? We reject the null hypothesis ($p < 0.0001$, lag of one month).

	Res.Df	Df	F	Pr(>F)
1	86			
2	88	-2	27.07	0.0000

Table 39: Does violent protest activity (Carter data) Granger-cause elite discourse about crime and riots? We reject the null hypothesis ($p < 0.0001$, lag of two months).

	Res.Df	Df	F	Pr(>F)
1	89			
2	90	-1	3.58	0.0619

Table 40: Does elite discourse about crime and riots Granger-cause violent protest activity (Carter data)? We fail to reject the null hypothesis ($p > 0.05$, lag of one month).

	Res.Df	Df	F	Pr(>F)
1	86			
2	88	-2	0.60	0.5502

Table 41: Does elite discourse about crime and riots Granger-cause violent protest activity (Carter data)? We fail to reject the null hypothesis ($p > 0.05$, lag of two months).

7 Balance Plot before and after CBPS Weighting




Figure 16: Dot plot of the absolute difference of standardized means between the original, unweighted covariates (dark circles) and the CBPS weighted covariates (open circles). All covariates show an improvement in balance after CBPS weighting.

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